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GETTING OUT OF THE FUNK: HOW 
WISCONSIN COURTS CAN PROTECT 
AGAINST THE THREAT TO IMPARTIAL 
JURY TRIALS 
This Comment critically examines the development of Wisconsin’s 
juror bias case law and the challenges that this body of law has created for 
judges and practitioners across the State of Wisconsin.  Further, this 
Comment analyzes whether attempts by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to 
clear up the body of juror bias law have been successful or, as this 
Comment suggests, have left juror bias law grappling with the same set of 
issues.  Wisconsin has long recognized the crucial role of the jury to its 
legal system and to ensuring the just administration of its laws.  To 
preserve the integrity of the jury system, Wisconsin courts should grant 
broad deference to trial court judges in resolving issues of jury bias.  
When determining whether a juror is capable of impartiality, the trial 
court has the benefit of invaluable information gathered from face-to-face 
observations of the jurors that is not available to appellate courts or 
adequately noted in the trial record.  This Comment suggests that 
appellate courts in Wisconsin, which lack access to trial court judges’ 
direct observations of juror bias, should consult the trial court judges, 
rather than relying solely on the trial record, regarding their findings on 
juror bias before deciding whether to uphold the trial judges’ decisions on 
appeal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent discourse in the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Funk1 
illustrates that current juror bias jurisprudence remains in a state of flux.  
The case, having three dissenting opinions,2 demonstrates that current 
juror bias standards can produce controversial results, which pose a 
threat to the legitimacy of Wisconsin trials involving issues of juror bias 
or jurors concealing information.  As noted in the past, confusing labels 
and inoperable standards3 have hindered the State of Wisconsin’s 
pursuit of that prized “instrument of justice,”4 an impartial jury, which is 
guaranteed both by its constitution5 and the Constitution of our nation.6  
To ensure that this prize is not forfeited, Wisconsin should consider both 
the fundamental principles that are served by voir dire, as well as how 
those principles can be practically administered by Wisconsin citizens 
and lawyers.7 
While pondering the future of Wisconsin’s juror bias jurisprudence, 
one must consider the obstacles facing jury selection—such as time 
constraints, maintaining judicial integrity, and the inability of some 
jurors to be impartial or aware of their prejudices—to ensure the 
ultimate success of the jury in serving its role as “the lamp that shows 
that freedom lives.”8  Acknowledging that a completely impartial jury is 
 
1. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. 
2. See id. ¶ 65 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); see id. ¶ 80 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see id. 
¶ 122 (Prosser, J., dissenting).  
3. See Sarvenaz J. Raissi, Comment, Analyzing Juror Bias Exhibited During Voir Dire in 
Wisconsin: How to Lessen the Confusion, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 517, 521 (2000). 
4. PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (3d ed. 1966).  
5. WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7; see State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770, 
777 (1999). 
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
7. Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Judging Bias: Juror Confidence and 
Judicial Rulings on Challenges for Cause, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 515 (2008) (“Jury 
selection procedures vary, but a significant part of voir dire is aimed at establishing whether a 
juror’s background or attitudes raise any ‘red flags’ about that person’s ability to keep an 
open mind during the trial.” (internal citation omitted)); see Christopher A. Cosper, 
Rehabilitation of the Juror Rehabilitation Doctrine, 37 GA. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (2003) (“The 
purpose of [voir dire] is to locate and remove any members of the venire who are biased, 
thereby fulfilling the constitutional commitment to provide for an impartial jury.”); see also 
VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 68 (1986) (discussing the 
importance of jury selection in allowing attorneys to meet the jury for the first time, 
strategically introduce facts, build rapport with the jury, and inform jurors on legal principles 
important to the case). 
8. DEVLIN, supra note 4, at 164.  
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unattainable, the jury is designed so that each juror will “enrich and 
correct the others’ perceptions in ways that will lead to a common or at 
least integrated understanding that might not have been available to 
them individually.”9  Voir dire serves as a tool to eliminate those 
perceptions that are most likely formed from “conscious or 
subconscious preconceptions and biases,”10 and its effectiveness is 
dependent upon the candor of jurors, the competency of trial lawyers, 
and the instincts of trial judges in evaluating juror bias challenges.11 
Therefore, to promote the integrity of jury trials in Wisconsin, 
adaptations should be made to promote juror candor and effective 
questioning methods by counsel, and special deference should be given 
to the experience and observations of trial court judges in making 
determinations on juror bias.12  I will begin outlining these potential 
changes, after first describing, in Part II of this Comment, Wisconsin’s 
attempt to clarify its juror bias jurisprudence in State v. Faucher13 and its 
surrounding era.  I will then discuss the effect of a more recent case, 
State v. Funk,14 in Part III.  Part IV will analyze appellate decisions 
subsequent to Faucher.  After discussing the existing relevant case law in 
Parts II through IV, I will suggest the ways that Wisconsin can improve 
in handling situations of juror bias. 
In Part V, I will address the need for trial judges to cautiously 
exercise discretion, guided by the ultimate goal of impartiality and 
avoiding liberal juror rehabilitation methods or other cost-saving 
measures that threaten constitutional rights.  Part VI will propose the 
Transamerica rule, which requires strong deference to the trial court 
judge’s determinations on whether a juror is fit to serve on the jury, 
ensures that defendants are properly afforded due process of law, avoids 
the negative impact on legitimacy that an appellate reversal can bring, 
 
9. See DEVLIN, supra note 4, at 149; JOHN KLEINIG, ETHICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
AN INTRODUCTION 187 (2008) (explaining that the “deliberative ideal” is often unattainable, 
due to improper influences).  
10. COMM. ON JURY STANDARDS, ABA JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., STANDARDS 
RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT 59 (1993).  
11. See State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 279–80, 588 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1999).  
12. See infra Parts V–VII; see also Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 279–80, 588 N.W.2d at 5 
(“The effectiveness of voir dire depends upon the thorough and well-reasoned questions 
posed by counsel and the circuit court, as well as the accuracy and completeness of the 
answers provided by prospective jurors.”).  
13. State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999). 
14. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. 
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and allows trial judges who have had face-to-face contact with particular 
jurors to make the credibility determinations rather than leaving this 
task to appellate judges reading from the record.15  Also in Part VI, I will 
demonstrate that while practicing attorneys must exercise care during 
voir dire, Wisconsin courts should be reluctant to place extreme burdens 
of specificity in questioning on counsel.16  The remainder of this 
Comment will further examine each of these topics, after first outlining 
the development and current state of juror bias jurisprudence. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WISCONSIN JUROR BIAS JURISPRUDENCE 
Wisconsin has placed a strong emphasis on the effectiveness of its 
jury systems and has promoted reforms and improvements to its jury 
systems for a number of years.17  Additionally, Wisconsin has recognized 
the crucial role that jurors play in our justice system and in 2008, dubbed 
the month of September “juror appreciation month.”18  Despite its 
progressive tradition, Wisconsin judges have still struggled to perfect the 
way they deal with issues of juror bias, particularly during voir dire.19  
 
15. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of ILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 282–83, 195 N.W.2d 656, 
662–63 (1972) (explaining that the court has repeatedly held that it is a denial of due process 
if an administrative agency overturns a finding of a hearing officer on a matter of credibility, 
without having access to the officer's impressions of the witnesses upon which the 
determinations were made). 
16. See State v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 99–100, 401 N.W.2d 748, 751–52 (1987) (explaining 
that a new trial may be required where the transcript is so insufficient as to prevent any 
meaningful appeal); see, e.g., Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 279–80, 588 N.W.2d at 5 (explaining the 
purpose of voir dire is to protect against potential bias, and that this is dependent upon 
effective questioning by counsel and the court, as well as the accuracy of the juror’s 
participation in the process); State v. Harris, 212 Wis. 2d 241, 568 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(demonstrating that the Perry rule is inapplicable where the record is insufficient due to a 
failure of counsel to make a request for voir dire or opening or closing arguments to be 
recorded); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 71.01 (2013); JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
THE AMERICAN JURY 124 (1987) (elaborating on the importance of interpersonal skills in 
interviewing jurors and effectively achieving their cooperation).  
17. See JAMES D. MILLER, JURY REFORM IN WISCONSIN: WHERE WE HAVE BEEN, 
WHERE WE ARE NOW, AND WHERE WE ARE GOING 5 (2006).   
18. Wisconsin Launches Juror Appreciation Program, WIS. CT. SYS. (Sep. 4, 2008), 
http://wicourts.gov/news/view.jsp?id=88; see OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, A PROCLAMATION 
(proclaiming the month of September as Juror Appreciation Month).  Local courts have also 
taken their own efforts to promote the juror appreciation program, including special prizes 
and gifts to jurors.  See Juror Appreciation Program, WIS. CT. SYS., http://www.wicourts.gov/s
ervices/juror/appreciation.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).   
19. See State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 705–06, 596 N.W.2d 770, 773 (1999); Raissi, 
supra note 3, at 539 (“The Wisconsin Supreme Court has struggled over the past decade to 
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Before discussing how the voir dire process can be improved, it is 
necessary to have a sense of the existing body of case law. 
A. State v. Faucher 
Before the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided State v. Faucher in 
1999,20 juror bias jurisprudence contained a myriad of confusing labels.21  
In light of this confusion, the Faucher court noted: 
From these cases we have come to recognize that our past 
decisions in this area of the law have to a degree lacked the 
clarity necessary to properly guide the bench and bar in the 
appropriate examination of prospective jurors for evidence of 
bias.  We believe that the resulting confusion stems from our 
inconsistent, and at times imprecise, use of the terms “implied,” 
“actual,” and “inferred” to describe a juror’s bias.  Today, we no 
longer refer to juror bias in these terms; their usefulness has run 
full course.22 
Thus, the court instituted new terminology to help relieve the 
confusion in applying the previous standards; under the new 
terminology, Wisconsin recognizes three types of juror bias: statutory, 
subjective, and objective.23  Statutory bias is simply a conclusive 
presumption of bias for anyone “related by ‘blood or marriage to any 
party or to any attorney appearing in [the] case’ and those who ‘[have] 
any financial interest in the case.’”24  The meanings of the remaining two 
concepts are less straightforward and intuitive. 
Courts intended subject bias to mean the bias revealed by a 
prospective juror’s “state of mind” on voir dire.25  However, as the court 
noted, this type of assessment is often incapable of being shown directly, 
and thus turns on the juror’s demeanor, answers during voir dire, 
truthfulness, credibility, and other pertinent factors.26  The court in 
 
define bias and determine when to properly overturn circuit court decisions judging juror 
bias.”).  
20. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770. 
21. See Raissi, supra note 3, at 517–25 (providing an overview of juror bias case law prior 
to the Faucher decision).  
22. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 705–06, 596 N.W.2d at 773. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. at 717, 596 N.W.2d at 778.  
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 717–18, 596 N.W.2d at 778.  
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Faucher seemingly granted broad discretion to the trial court’s 
assessment of subjective bias, stating that it “believe[s] that the circuit 
court sits in a superior position to assess the demeanor and disposition 
of prospective jurors.”27  In contrast to the Faucher decision, the court’s 
decision in Funk over a decade later placed severe limitations upon the 
trial courts’ ultimate authority to remove a juror it believes to be biased 
or to order a new trial when a juror is found to have concealed a bias 
during voir dire.28 
In contrast to subjective bias, objective bias has a broader focus.  
While still considering the individual juror’s responses, the objective 
bias inquiry must also consider the “facts and circumstances surrounding 
the voir dire and the facts involved in the case.”29  The focus of the 
inquiry is whether a reasonable juror, taking into account all of the 
surrounding circumstances, would be capable of being impartial.30  
Because the objective bias determination poses a mixed question of fact 
and law, appellate courts must give deference to the trial courts’ findings 
“regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding voir dire and [these 
findings] will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.”31  However, 
whether those facts meet the necessary legal standard is a question of 
law open to de novo review by appellate courts and facts not necessarily 
apparent from the record, such as observations of a juror’s demeanor, 
may be afforded due deference.32  As this Comment will demonstrate, 
such a standard of review highlights a significant departure of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court from its tradition of affording broad 
 
27. Id. at 718, 596 N.W.2d at 778.  
28. Compare id. (illustrating that despite this particular court’s error in failing to remove 
juror Kaiser, a trial court’s determination will generally serve as adequate protection for a 
defendant’s right to an impartial jury and thus will be granted deference so long as it is not 
clearly erroneous), with State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 48, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 
(demonstrating a seemingly higher burden on the court to earn deference as the trial court’s 
assessment in finding bias was not fully articulated in the record).   
 In addition, in Faucher, the court overruled the trial court’s finding of no objective bias, 
because the juror had expressly stated a bias towards a witness.  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 732, 
596 N.W.2d at 784–85.  In contrast, in Funk, the court overruled the trial court based on what 
was not present in the record, making the trial judge’s assessment of greater importance.  See 
Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 48, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.   
29. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718, 596 N.W.2d at 779. 
30. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 49, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 
718–19, 596 N.W.2d at 779. 
31. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 30, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.  
32. Id. 
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discretion to trial court judges on matters of juror bias.33 
B. A Brief Overview of the Case Law in the Faucher and Pre-Faucher 
Era 
Because discussion of the case law leading up to and culminating in 
the Faucher case already exists,34 I will only briefly discuss these cases 
and highlight their contributions to the current juror candor 
jurisprudence.  As illustrated in Sarvenaz Raissi’s Comment, Analyzing 
Juror Bias Exhibited During Voir Dire in Wisconsin: How to Lessen the 
Confusion, Wisconsin juror bias jurisprudence prior to Faucher 
culminated in the cases of State v. Louis,35  State v. Gesch,36 State v. 
Ramos,37 and State v. Ferron.38  In addition, cases such as State v. Wyss39 
and State v. Delgado40 are of particular importance in juror candor cases. 
These cases place a great amount of discretion in the hands of trial 
court judges to make determinations of juror bias, particularly Louis, in 
which the court refused to adopt a per se rule against seating police 
officers of the jurisdiction where the crime occurred.41  Instead, the court 
emphasized the trial court judge’s role in assessing the juror’s 
impartiality, which must be undertaken in all circumstances absent a 
specific statutory exclusion.42  The Gesch decision stretched the 
boundaries of Louis by stating that certain close relationships between 
 
33. See, e.g., State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 496–97, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1998). 
34. See Raissi, supra note 3.  
35. State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990).  
36. State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992).  
37. State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), overruled by State v. Lindell, 
2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223.  
38. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654. 
39. State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985). 
40. State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999). 
41. State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 474, 457 N.W.2d 484, 486 (1990); see Raissi, supra 
note 3, at 519.  
42. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d at 479–80, 457 N.W.2d at 488.  The court in Louis further 
demonstrated that past decisions have allowed the trial courts discretion in refusing to strike 
jurors for cause so long as the trial courts engaged in inquiry into the juror’s impartiality.  Id. 
at 480–81, 457 N.W.2d at 489; see Nyberg v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 404–05, 249 N.W.2d 524, 
526 (1977), overruled by Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654; McGeever v. State, 239 
Wis. 87, 97, 300 N.W. 485, 489 (1941); see also Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 15, 564 N.W.2d at 330; 
State v. Chosa, 108 Wis. 2d 392, 395–96, 321 N.W.2d 280, 282 (1982) (explaining that the trial 
court judge may not exercise discretion as to a juror’s bias based on some observable 
characteristic without first questioning the individual jurors about their inability to be 
impartial). 
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trial participants and prospective jurors result in an implied or 
“unconscious bias,” and thus, the trial court had erred by refusing to 
strike a juror who was related to a State witness despite finding the 
juror’s statements of impartiality credible.43  Ramos, which has since 
been overruled, demonstrates the emphasis placed on achieving 
impartiality in voir dire in this era, because under the rule of that case, a 
trial court’s error in refusing to strike a juror for cause would be grounds 
for automatic reversal.44 
In addition, Ferron emphasized, like much of Wisconsin’s juror bias 
jurisprudence, that when it comes to juror bias determinations, the trial 
court’s assessment is paramount.45  Ferron instructed trial courts to 
strike prospective jurors these courts could “reasonably suspect”46 to be 
biased; however, it overruled Nyberg v. State47 by stating that appellate 
courts were not held to this same standard upon review.48 
In Ferron, a juror was left on the jury after he expressed doubts 
about whether he could remain impartial knowing that the defendant, 
Ferron, would be exercising his Fifth Amendment right and not taking 
the witness stand.49  The court did not accept Ferron’s arguments that 
the reasonable suspicion test should also apply at the appellate level,50 
instead stating that refusals to strike jurors for cause at the trial court 
 
43. State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 666–67, 482 N.W.2d 99, 102 (1992); see Raissi, supra 
note 3, at 520 (providing a summary of the court’s decision). 
44. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 24–25, 564 N.W.2d at 334; see Raissi, supra note 3, at 521.  
45. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 496–97, 579 N.W.2d at 660 (“It is a well-settled principle of 
law in this state that a determination by a circuit court that a prospective juror can be 
impartial should be overturned only where the prospective juror’s bias is ‘manifest.’”). 
46. Id. at 495–96, 579 N.W.2d at 660. 
47. Nyberg, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 249 N.W.2d 524.  
48. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 496–97, 579 N.W.2d at 660 (explaining that appellate courts 
are not required to displace a trial court ruling on a prospective juror’s impartiality, whenever 
the appellate record supports a reasonable suspicion of juror bias).  Thus, the Ferron decision 
is yet another example of the State’s previous policy of allowing great deference to the trial 
court’s discretion.  See id. 
49. Id. at 488, 579 N.W.2d at 657.  Juror James Metzler stated, “Well, I would have a 
hard time believing that he was innocent if he didn’t take the stand and tell me he wasn’t [sic] 
innocent.  That’s just my own belief.”  Id.  When asked if he would be able to consider only 
the evidence presented and set aside this opinion, Mr. Metzler gave responses of, “Well, I 
would certainly try to set it aside” and “Probably.”  Id. at 489, 579 N.W.2d at 657.  For a full 
transcript of the exchange between counsel and Juror Metzler, see Raissi, supra note 3, at 
522–23.   
50. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 497, 579 N.W.2d at 661. 
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level is reversible error only when bias is manifest.51  Bias is manifest 
when the record does not support a finding that the “juror is a 
reasonable person who is sincerely willing to put aside an opinion or 
prior knowledge; or . . . does not support a finding that a reasonable 
person in the juror’s position could set aside the opinion or prior 
knowledge.”52  However, despite adopting a standard granting seemingly 
broad power of discretion to trial court judges, the end result of Ferron 
(finding error in refusing to excuse juror Metzler for cause) seemed to 
simultaneously withdraw some of the trial court’s discretion.53  However, 
this apparent incongruence, as I will discuss later in the Part IV of this 
Comment, did not appear as drastic in the court of appeals decision in 
State v. Oswald.54 
In addition to Louis, Gesch, Ramos, and Ferron, the decision of State 
v. Delgado55 is of importance to the pre-Faucher era and is also 
important as a point for comparison to the decision in Funk because of 
its similar factual circumstances.  In Delgado, the defendant was found 
guilty of committing six counts of first-degree sexual assault against two 
young girls.56  During voir dire, Juror C failed to disclose that she had 
been a victim of sexual assault as a child, despite questions being posed 
to the jury as a whole, as well as to Juror C individually.57  For example, 
each juror was asked whether he or she had been either a victim or a 
witness to a crime.58  Later Juror C revealed in an emotional outburst 
during jury deliberations that she was a past victim of sexual assault.59  In 
addition, in a post-trial hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new 
 
51. Id. at 496–97, 579 N.W.2d at 660. 
52. Id. at 498, 579 N.W.2d at 661. 
53. Id. at 510–11, 579 N.W.2d at 666 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (explaining how the 
majority has seemingly “violate[d] its own test” by overruling the trial judge’s assessment of 
the juror based on the statement of the juror being too unequivocal in the record). 
54. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238. 
55. State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999).  Like in Funk, in Delgado 
the court had to face the question of how to deal with a juror in a sexual assault case who did 
not disclose having been a victim to a sexual assault herself.  Id. at 272–73, 588 N.W.2d at 2.   
56. Id. at 272, 588 N.W.2d at 2.  
57. Id. at 273–74, 588 N.W.2d at 3.  When asked whether she had ever been a victim or 
witness of a crime, Juror C stated that she had not.  Id. at 274, 588 N.W.2d at 3.  Further, the 
jury as a whole was asked, “Are there any members of the jury panel who either have a close 
friend or close relative or you yourself who have been the victim of a sexual assault, either as 
a child or as an adult?”  Id. at 274–75, 588 N.W.2d at 3 (internal quotes omitted).  
58. Id. at 273–74, 588 N.W.2d at 3.  
59. Id. at 273–75, 285, 588 N.W.2d at 3–4, 8.   
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trial, Juror C stated that she had answered the questions honestly as she 
believed they should be answered and was not biased against the 
defendant.60  Surprisingly, the trial court judge found Juror C’s 
testimony credible and upheld the conviction because she had not 
incorrectly responded to a material question.61 
Delgado made two important contributions to juror bias case law.  
First, although the decision relied on pre-Faucher terminology, it 
stressed that just because there is no actual bias and a juror asserts his or 
her impartiality, the court must nonetheless consider all the 
circumstances of voir dire, including the fact of non-disclosure itself, to 
determine whether the juror is biased.62  Second, the Delgado case 
stressed the importance of examining the similarity of the juror’s 
experience to that of the victim, as well as observing jurors’ behaviors 
during voir dire and deliberations.63  These contributions position the 
court to protect its integrity and the right of litigants to an impartial trial 
by demonstrating a respect for the complex nature of bias and how it 
operates at both subconscious and conscious levels.64 
Finally, some discussion of the decision of State v. Wyss65 is required 
to understand how grounds for a new trial are determined in Wisconsin 
when a juror fails to accurately disclose information during voir dire.66  
As this Comment will later discuss, the case established the two-step 
analysis used to determine whether a new trial is warranted based on a 
juror’s concealment or lack of candor.67  However, what is more 
important for the purposes of this Comment is the reasoning advanced 
by the court.  First, the court acknowledged the justifications behind the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in McDonough Power 
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood68 that a per se rule of granting new trials 
 
60. Id. at 276, 588 N.W.2d at 4.  
61. Id. at 277, 588 N.W.2d at 4; see also State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 
(1985); infra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
62. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 285, 588 N.W.2d at 7 (explaining that despite a belief of 
impartiality, “the juror’s conduct might have revealed such a close connection between the 
juror and the case that bias may be inferred”).  
63. Id. at 285–86, 588 N.W.2d at 7–8. 
64. See id.; infra notes 175–80 and accompanying text (explaining the complex nature of 
juror bias and the cautious approach courts should take towards juror bias).  
65. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745.  
66. Id. at 726, 370 N.W.2d at 766.  
67. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 92–93.  
68. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984).  
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in all of these situations would be too costly.69  Second, the court 
modified the two-step analysis of McDonough because the test failed to 
consider the possibility that a juror may answer honestly, yet still 
provide an incorrect response.70  However, only later cases, such as 
Ferron and Funk, demonstrate how to deal with situations where a juror 
incorrectly answers a question during voir dire and what types of 
“exceptional circumstances” may allow bias to be inferred.71 
III. STATE V. FUNK 
In Funk, the defendant was accused of having committed multiple 
sexual assaults against a minor who was ten years old at the time of the 
alleged acts.72  Around the time voir dire began, the court stressed the 
inflammatory nature of the case to the jury, as well as informed them 
that they would be asked questions regarding whether they had been 
victims of a sexual assault themselves or if they knew anyone who had 
been a victim.73  Further, the judge gave special instructions regarding 
these questions, stating: 
With respect to [these] question[s], to be quite frank with you, if 
somebody asked me . . . I wouldn’t answer [them], but you are 
under oath; maybe it’s a brother or a sister, maybe it’s a 
neighbor, or maybe it’s yourself.   
We could go into chambers, if you wish to; we certainly don’t 
have to.  You need to be honest.  You need to answer the 
question, and what we will do is to avoid any embarrassment, we 
can go into chambers.74 
Despite this warning, neither the attorneys nor the judge asked these 
questions of the jury directly.75  However, some jurors disclosed 
information about personally being a victim of a sexual assault or 
knowing someone who was in response to other questions, and the 
prosecution did state, “Now, this case, as Judge Roemer noted, involves 
allegations of sexual assault of a child.  Based upon those allegations, 
 
69. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 724–25, 370 N.W.2d at 765–66.  
70. Id. at 726–27, 370 N.W.2d at 766–67.  
71. Id. at 729, 370 N.W.2d at 768 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 464 U.S. at 
556–57 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
72. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 3, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. 
73. Id. ¶ 4. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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those charges, does anyone here believe they would have a difficult time 
being fair and impartial both to the State and to the Defendant?”76  This 
question led to further admissions by jurors as to sexual assaults 
committed against them or people they knew, which resulted in two 
further exclusions from the jury.77  Of the two replacement jurors, one 
admitted to knowing someone sexually assaulted, was replaced, and 
then his replacement was also replaced having known a relative 
incarcerated for sexual assault and admitting that he would not be able 
to be impartial.78 
Despite all of this activity during voir dire, one particular juror, 
“Tanya G.,” remained silent as to having been a victim of sexual assault 
in 1998,79 while roughly the same age as the victim, having known of her 
two younger sisters being so abused,80 and having been a victim to 
another sexual assault in 2005.81  Furthermore, Tanya G. remained silent 
when questions were asked by Funk’s attorney as to whether any jurors 
had previously testified in a criminal or civil case,82 despite having 
testified against the perpetrator of the 2005 assault.83  After the trial, 
when Funk’s attorney learned that Tanya G. was a victim of sexual 
assault, he moved to vacate the judgment,84 and a post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing was held.85  At the hearing, Tanya G. was asked 
various questions regarding whether she was made uncomfortable 
during trial or thought about her past incidents during the course of the 
trial, to which she replied with a simple “No” to each question.86 
However, when asked about why she failed to disclose the incidents, 
Tanya G. responded that a settlement agreement, subject to a penalty, 
prevented her from disclosing any information regarding her 1998 
sexual assault.87  However, she admitted that she probably should have 
discussed her sisters’ assaults, but withheld because they had “nothing 
 
76. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.  
77. Id. ¶ 6. 
78. Id. ¶¶ 7–8.  
79. Id. ¶ 12.   
80. Id. ¶ 13.   
81. Id. ¶ 14.  
82. Id. ¶ 10.   
83. Id. ¶ 14.  
84. Id. ¶ 12.  
85. Id. ¶ 15. 
86. Id. ¶ 18 n.11.  
87. Id. ¶ 16. 
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else on their records indicating sexual assault, [so she] wasn’t allowed to 
put them in jeopardy.”88  In regards to the 2005 sexual assault, Tanya G. 
indicated that she did not disclose the information because it was 
information that she strived to suppress, and that to recount the memory 
was “not the way [she] live[d] [her] life.”89  In light of Tanya G.’s failure 
to respond to voir dire questions, the trial court found her to be both 
subjectively and objectively biased, vacated the judgment of conviction 
against Funk, and ordered a new trial.90 
After the order was affirmed by the court of appeals, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the trial court 
properly applied both the objective and subjective bias standards.91  The 
court applied the two-step test, announced in State v. Wyss,92  to 
determine whether a new trial is warranted.  The Wyss test requires “(1) 
that the juror incorrectly or incompletely responded to a material 
question on voir dire; and if so, (2) that it is more probable than not that 
under the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case, the 
juror was biased against the moving party.”93  The court found that the 
first element was satisfied, but reinstated the verdict of conviction, 
because the latter element was not.94  To support this conclusion, the 
court demonstrated how the trial court had inappropriately reached 
conclusions as to both objective and subjective bias.95 
 
88. Id. 
89. Id. ¶ 17.  Although doing one’s best to forget a tragic occurrence is an admirable 
goal, it should not take precedent over litigant’s rights to an impartial trial, especially where, 
as here, the judge took extra precaution to protect prospective juror’s privacy.  See U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to an impartial trial); WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 
7(same); see also NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES 110 (5th ed. 
2011) (providing that if juror privacy were endangered by constitutional voir dire 
requirements, the constitutional right to an impartial jury would have to supersede jury 
privacy concerns).  Furthermore, even suppressed memories have the potential to 
subconsciously influence a person and may surface into an active memory at any point in 
time.  See generally Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 518, 518 (1993) (discussing various instances and studies of repressed 
memory cases in the legal system).  
90. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 23, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.  
91. Id. ¶¶ 24, 28–29.  
92. State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 726, 370 N.W.2d 745, 766 (1985).  
93. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 32, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (quoting Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 
at 726, 370 N.W.2d at 766). 
94. Id. ¶ 64. 
95. Id. ¶¶ 44–62 (explaining why a finding of bias was inappropriate under each 
standard).  
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Regarding subjective bias, the court stressed the failure of both the 
trial court and the attorneys to ask Tanya G. directly about the sexual 
assaults during voir dire and the fact that none of Tanya G.’s assertions 
were explicit assertions of bias.96  The court’s analysis for objective bias 
was similar.97  The court essentially concluded that Tanya G.’s past 
experiences and silences were not enough, in light of her statements of 
impartiality, to render her incapable of being impartial.98  The court’s 
emphasis on the failure of the trial court and attorneys to probe more 
deeply into Tanya G.’s potential bias before finding her incapable of 
being impartial illustrates that our current case law may possess a high 
tolerance for juror bias.99  How this heightened tolerance is created and 
the threat it poses will be further explored after first reviewing the case 
law preceding and subsequent to the Faucher decision to understand the 
development of Wisconsin’s juror bias jurisprudence. 
While the goal of creating the new terminology was to set standards 
that reflect the reason for juror removal, as well as to describe the 
analysis of the judge,100 the new standards nonetheless caused much 
disagreement amongst the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  In Funk,101 Justice 
Abrahamson, in her dissent, went so far as to say that the objective and 
subjective categories were destined to be combined.102  While some 
discussion regarding the confusion of this new standard was already 
launched in 2000,103 there has been little to no commentary on voir dire 
in Wisconsin since.  A more thorough examination of the topic is 
necessitated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Funk, along 
with an overall lack of guidance in juror candor cases104 as to the extent 
of the trial judge’s discretion during voir dire or the amount of 
responsibility placed on attorneys to draw out juror bias.105 
 
96. Id. ¶¶ 44–45.  
97. See id. ¶ 49.  
98. See id. ¶¶ 49–63.  
99. See id. ¶ 63. 
100. State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 706, 596 N.W.2d 770, 773 (1999).  
101. Funk, 2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. 
102. Id. ¶¶ 70–73 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); see also Raissi, supra note 3, at 538.  
103. See generally Raissi, supra note 3, at 521 (providing discussion of the confusion 
caused by juror bias case law). 
104. See, e.g., State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 742, 370 N.W.2d 745, 774 (1985).   
105. See Raissi, supra note 3, at 529–30.  Raissi illustrates an example of a discussion of 
juror candor, id., which I argue should be revisited in light of the Funk decision.  
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IV. CASE LAW POST-FAUCHER AND APPELLATE APPLICATIONS OF 
THE FAUCHER RULE 
Just as the interpretation used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 
Funk raises doubts about which policies are embodied by Wisconsin 
juror bias jurisprudence and precedent set by the Faucher era decisions, 
subsequent applications further call into question the court’s decision to 
overturn the trial court’s use of discretion in ordering a new trial.106 
An interesting fact situation presented an opportunity for the court 
to affirm the principle that under circumstances that are “so fraught 
with the possibility of bias . . . [the court] must find objective bias 
regardless of the particular juror’s assurances of impartiality.”107  In State 
v. Tody, Judge Eaton found himself in an awkward position: forced to 
consider his mother’s ability to be an impartial juror in a trial over which 
he was presiding.108  Furthermore, after neither party exercised a 
peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Eaton, the judge found himself in 
an even more difficult situation based on his belief that he did not “have 
any legal basis for excusing her,” and he reluctantly denied a motion to 
strike her from the jury.109  The Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that 
Judge Eaton’s belief was misplaced, and in overturning both the trial 
court and court of appeals decision, announced that: 
The correct principle of law that should have guided the circuit 
court judge is that a circuit court judge should err on the side of 
dismissing a challenged juror when the challenged juror’s 
presence may create bias or an appearance of bias.  The reason 
for this principle of law is that a circuit court’s striking a 
prospective juror who raises issues of bias saves judicial time and 
resources in the long run.110 
The court justified its conclusion on the fact that previous case law 
has demonstrated the pervasive effects of juror bias on the overall trial 
process, and that such a “defect affecting the framework within which 
the trial proceeds,” should be dealt with at the trial court level because 
 
106. The Faucher-era decisions seem to place a great amount of authority into the hands 
of the trial court, as well as weigh heavily the idea that the court should err on the side of 
caution and maintaining an appearance of impartiality.  See supra Part II.  
107. State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶ 5, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737.  
108. Id. ¶¶ 10, 16. 
109. Id. ¶ 17; see also id. ¶ 16 (demonstrating Judge Eaton’s reservations about allowing 
his mother to serve as a juror).  
110. Id. ¶ 32.  
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of the grave effects of bias on the “fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”111 
The implications of this decision are twofold.  First, the decision 
demonstrates an important policy consideration that it is better for the 
judge, for the sake of judicial economy and integrity, to err on the side 
of caution in striking jurors in situations where a juror may be biased or 
may create “an appearance of bias.”112  Second, the case shows the 
strong respect for trial court discretion that was also crucial in decisions 
such as State v. Louis113 and State v. Gesch.114  The idea that trial courts 
should err on the side of caution and their judgments should be given 
special deference in these situations seemed to be a powerful theme in 
prior Wisconsin case law and is also embodied in case law at the federal 
level.115 
A case more recent than Funk, State v. Sellhausen,116 potentially 
 
111. Id. ¶ 44.  
112. Id. ¶ 32; see, e.g., State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 495–496, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660 
(1998) (discussing that past case law has traditionally promoted trial courts to act in this 
cautious fashion). 
113. State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 479, 457 N.W.2d 484, 488 (1990).  
114. State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 666, 482 N.W.2d 99, 102 (1992); see also Tody, 2009 
WI 31, ¶ 29, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737. 
115. See, e.g., Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 495–96, 579 N.W.2d at 660; infra text accompanying 
note 124.  Granting deference to the credibility determinations of the trial judge is a policy 
that is seen in varying contexts in federal courts.  See, e.g., United States v. Curb, 626 F.3d 
921, 925 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that in the context of sentencing hearings the appellate 
court “do[es] not second guess the judge’s credibility determinations because he or she has 
had the best opportunity to observe the subject’s facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, 
eye contact, posture and body movements” (quoting United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 
701 n.22 (7th Cir. 1999))); Kadia v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining the 
federal policy of deference to the trial judge’s determination of credibility in the context of 
asylum cases).  The court in Kadia, aptly explained the difficulty of credibility assessments by 
stating:  
Credibility assessments can embody a struggle between norms of subjective and 
objective decision-making.  Subjective assessments are highly personal to the 
decision-maker, dependent on personal judgment, perceptions, and disposition, and 
often lacking in articulated logic.  They are very difficult to review and are likely to 
be inconsistent from one decision-maker to another.  
Id. (quoting Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder: Objective Credibility 
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 367, 374 (2003)).  
116. State v. Sellhausen, 2012 WI 5, 338 Wis. 2d 286, 809 N.W.2d 14.  Although 
implicating a per se objective bias standard for judge’s immediate family members by 
emphasizing the best practice is to avoid the appearance of bias, the court did not make a per 
se standard explicit in Tody, but rather held that a judge’s mother would be objectively 
biased.  Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶¶ 37–39, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737. 
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retreated from the standard set forth in Tody—there, Justice Ziegler’s 
concurrence indicated that a judge’s immediate family member is not 
per se objectively biased.117  However, the court did not stray from the 
consistent theme of juror bias case law—that determinations of juror 
bias should be left to the broad discretion of the trial judge—and noted 
that it was still within the inherent authority of the judge to strike such a 
juror for cause if the judge believed he or she could not be impartial.118  
Further, the case considered a familial relationship less close (the 
judge’s daughter-in-law) than the one at issue in Tody (the judge’s 
mother).119  While some may interpret this decision as a death knell to 
the notion that courts should avoid the appearance of bias, as this is the 
argument that the defendant in Sellhausen relied upon,120 this argument 
is misplaced.  A judge is supposed to be a neutral party, and thus a 
family member of a judge should not demonstrate any partiality to 
either party in the absence of other facts drawn out during voir dire.  
Further, the Wisconsin Supreme Court made specific note of the 
precautions taken by the trial court judge to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety and that this practice was sufficient to avoid following the 
typical recommended course of action and removing the family member 
sua sponte.121 
Similar to Tody, the court in State v. Lindell122 alluded to the 
principle raised in State v. Ferron, 123 instructing trial court judges to err 
on the side of caution and strike jurors whenever they “reasonably 
suspect” that juror bias exists.124  In Lindell, the defendant was convicted 
of intentional homicide, arson, and burglary; he appealed his conviction 
on the grounds that he was required to use a peremptory challenge on a 
juror who should have been removed for cause.125  Because of the 
 
117. See Sellhausen, 2012 WI 5, ¶ 73, 338 Wis. 2d 286, 809 N.W.2d 14 (Ziegler, J., 
concurring).  The Sellhausen majority did not go so far as to hold that a family member was 
per se objectively biased.  See id. ¶¶ 29–30 (majority opinion). 
118. Id. ¶¶ 73, 75. 
119. Id.  
120. See id. ¶ 29. 
121. Id.  
122. State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223. 
123. State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 495–96, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660 (1998). 
124. Id.; see also State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶ 46, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737 
(explaining that the appearance of bias should be avoided); Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶ 49, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (instructing courts to err on the side of caution in striking jurors 
that appear biased). 
125. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶ 5–8, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223. 
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intensity of media coverage of the event, there was a great deal of 
concern by the court and the parties as to whether an impartial jury 
could be impaneled.126  During the course of voir dire, the defense 
counsel asked to remove a juror who had done business with the 
deceased victim and had been close friends with the victim’s wife for 
over twenty years.127  The court denied the request indicating that the 
juror’s assurances of impartiality precluded it from doing so.128 
On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that the trial 
judge’s conclusion that he was incapable of removing the juror was 
incorrect; not only could he have removed the juror, but also he erred in 
failing to do so.129  The court concluded that juror D.F. was objectively 
biased based on the totality of the circumstances, as a reasonable person 
in her position could not have remained impartial and thus should have 
been struck for cause.130  However, the court overruled Ramos by 
upholding the conviction.131  Under Ramos, an automatic reversal was 
required whenever a court failed to appropriately strike a juror for 
cause and consequently deprived a defendant of a peremptory strike.132  
The court found that the Ramos rule would grant too much protection 
to defendants and require trials even where no harm was likely caused 
by the defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge.133  Although measures 
promoting the efficiency of jury selection should be approached 
cautiously, as they sometimes come at the cost of impartiality,134 the 
effect of the ruling in Lindell appears to appropriately balance the 
 
126. Id. ¶¶ 16–20.  In fact, the defendant made numerous attempts to alleviate this 
problem by asking for individual voir dire of prospective jurors, attempting to switch venue, 
and sending out extensive jury questionnaires.  Id. ¶¶ 18–19.  
127. Id. ¶¶ 23–25.  
128. Id. ¶ 25.  
129. Id. ¶ 41. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. ¶ 131. 
132. State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 24–25, 564 N.W.2d 328, 334 (1997), overruled by 
Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; see State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 
514, 579 N.W.2d 654, 667 (1998) (applying the Ramos rule).  
133. See Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶ 104, 107, 115, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223. 
134. See State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 280, 588 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1999) (stating that “the 
value of finality and the sanctity of a jury verdict must yield when juror bias undermines 
confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the trial”); Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, 
Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process 
in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1186–90 (1993) (demonstrating the undesirable 
consequences of limited voir dire proceedings in failing to discover juror biases). 
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ultimate goal of impartiality against practical considerations of judicial 
efficiency.135 
Prior to both Lindell and Tody, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
provided an overview of juror bias case law shortly after the Faucher 
decision in State v. Oswald,136 a case cited in Justice Bradley’s dissent in 
Funk.137  Similar to Louis, Gesch, Faucher, and the majority of juror bias 
jurisprudence at this point in time, the case showed a strong emphasis 
on the breadth of a trial court’s discretion on the issue.138  Also, the 
Oswald case illustrated three situations which warrant the finding of 
objective bias: (1) when a juror has a direct connection to crucial 
evidence to be presented at trial,139 (2) when the juror “has a direct 
connection to a dispositive issue in the case,”140 or (3) when a juror has 
an inflexible negative attitude towards the criminal justice system in 
general.141  The court further elucidated that a juror’s marriage to a law 
enforcement officer was not a significant connection and that the trial 
judge could have properly concluded that the juror could be impartial.142 
Aside from affirming the importance of granting deference to the 
 
135. See Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶ 118, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; see also Ferron, 
219 Wis. 2d at 514–15, 579 N.W.2d at 667–68 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (foreshadowing the 
eventual overruling of the Ramos rule and recognizing that the right of the defendant is to an 
impartial jury and not to be able to “shuffle a jury pool in their favor”). 
136. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 5, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238 (explaining 
that the trial court’s assessments of subjective bias will only be overturned if clearly 
erroneous, while objective bias determinations will be upheld so long as a reasonable judge 
could have made the same conclusion).  The court makes special note that the previous case 
law has firmly entrenched the trial court with ultimate authority to decide issues of bias, 
stating “Faucher, Kiernan, Mendoza and Erickson nail down the proposition that ‘questions 
as to a prospective juror’s sincere willingness to set aside bias should be largely left to the 
circuit court’s discretion.’”  Id. ¶ 6 (quoting Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 501, 579 N.W.2d at 662).  
For a summary of the case’s contribution to juror bias case law, see Raissi, supra note 3, at 
533–36.  
137. State v. Funk 2011 WI 62, ¶ 93, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.  
138. See supra text accompanying note 136.  
139. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 9, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238; see also State v. 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 707–09, 596 N.W.2d 770, 774 (1999) (demonstrating that where a 
juror has preconceived notions of a key witness based on a relationship between the two, the 
juror is objectively biased); Raissi, supra note 3, at 534.  
140. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 11, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238; see Raissi, supra 
note 3, at 534.  
141. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 12, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238; see Raissi, supra 
note 3, at 534.  
142. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 21, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238; see Raissi, supra 
note 3, at 535–36. 
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trial court, the Oswald decision clarified that the seemingly elevated 
demand placed on jurors’ statements of impartiality in Ferron was not a 
standard applicable to other cases, but rather that the Ferron holding 
was limited to the facts of that particular case.143  In addition, the Oswald 
decision set forth an important framework for analyzing whether a 
particular relationship or experience disqualifies a juror.144  By stressing 
the important distinctions between the juror in State v. Erickson, who 
had also been a victim of sexual abuse as a child,145 and the juror in 
Faucher, who had expressed a direct relationship to a witness (and was 
thus excluded),146 the court once again made clear that trial court judges 
must determine whether a past experience has rendered a juror biased.147  
This assessment is to be based not only on the juror’s statements, 
demeanor, and tone, but also on the proximity of the events in time and 
their factual similarity.148  Oswald and Erickson shed light on how to deal 
with situations in which jurors’ past experiences create a suspicion of 
bias, a situation which the court faced in Funk, and also demonstrated 
that this analysis is best suited for the trial court.149 
 
143. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 7, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238 (explaining that an 
unequivocal assertion of impartiality is not required of jurors on voir dire, and the Ferron 
case was limited to its unique factual circumstance—a juror who demonstrated bias against 
the defendant based on his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to not testify).  
144. Id. ¶ 10 (explaining the decisions of Erickson and Faucher and the important 
distinction between the two in terms of the closeness of the relationship or the proximity of 
the experience that has potential for bias). 
145. State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 763, 596 N.W.2d 749, 753 (1999).  
146. State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 732, 596 N.W.2d 770, 785 (1999). 
147. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.  
148. Id. (stating that the remoteness in time between the Erickson juror’s sexual assault 
experience and the current case “lessen[ed] the chance it would taint her judgment”); see also 
State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 286, 588 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1999) (explaining that Juror C’s 
“emotional involvement” with the case is partially a product of “the close similarity of her 
experience with the crimes charged”). 
149. See Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 763, 596 N.W.2d at 753 (depicting the trial court's 
assessment of Juror L. in State v. Erickson, which demonstrated an appropriate evaluation by 
the trial court judge of the particular juror’s bias in light of her demeanor, responses, etc.).  
The court’s analysis read as follows:  
Well, [Juror L] is well into her 60’s.  The event took place when she was about 12 
years of age.  She talked about it without showing any emotion.  She was open and 
seemed to be free of stress in discussing it.  Her explanation that she didn’t report it 
because she was ashamed is I think a very natural reaction.  There [have] been 
considerable writings in the press that the average person is likely to read which 
report similar reactions from victims.  Her contact was sudden and forced upon her 
and of a sexual contact nature, a brief encounter, wholly different from what would 
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However, as previously discussed, the majority in Funk chose not to 
honor the trial court’s decision that Tanya G. was biased.150  Instead the 
court overturned the trial court based upon on a review of the record of 
Tanya’s responses to questions regarding her impartiality during voir 
dire and at a post-conviction hearing.151  The court’s decision to ignore 
the guidance of the trial court is troubling for two reasons.  First, the 
decision put too much faith in the juror’s recorded statements of 
impartiality without the ability to consider the surrounding 
circumstances and demeanor of the juror.152  Second, the court did not 
appropriately weigh the likelihood of unconscious biases, based on the 
similarity between Tanya’s past experiences and those of the victim.153 
V. JUROR REHABILITATION MUST BE APPROACHED WITH  
CAUTION TO EFFECTIVELY PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL  
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
Theoretically, the ultimate purpose of voir dire is to attempt to 
eliminate biased jurors in order to secure a fair and impartial jury.154  As 
 
be presented here.  I’m satisfied that she can act fairly and impartially.  
Id. at 763–64 n.5, 596 N.W.2d at 753 n.5; see also State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 1–2, 335 Wis. 
2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 285–86, 588 N.W.2d at 8; Oswald, 2000 WI 
App 3, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.  
150. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 64, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; see supra text 
accompanying notes 91–95.    
151. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 1–2, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. 
152. See id. ¶¶ 2, 18 n.11; infra notes 167, 174, 176 and accompanying text (explaining 
that there are numerous biases both conscious and unconscious and thus statements of 
impartiality should be approached with caution and considered in light of the surrounding 
circumstances). 
153. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 2, 18 n.11, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; see infra notes 
167, 174 and accompanying text (explaining that there are numerous biases both conscious 
and unconscious and thus statements of impartiality should be approached with caution and 
considered in light of the surrounding circumstances).  
154. JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND 
SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY 324 (2d ed. 1990) (“The theoretical purpose of voir dire is to 
determine the state of the jurors’ minds so that a fair and impartial jury can be chosen”); see 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing the right to impartial jury); WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7 
(same); see State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court for La Crosse Cnty., 115 Wis. 2d 
220, 239, 340 N.W.2d 460, 469 (1983) (stating that the purpose of voir dire is “to select jurors 
who will make an impartial decision upon the basis of the evidence presented to them”); 
United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973) (“The primary purpose of the voir 
dire of jurors is to make possible the impaneling of an impartial jury through questions that 
permit the intelligent exercise of challenges by counsel.”); Jennifer H. Case, Satisfying the 
Appearance of Justice When Juror’s Intentional Nondisclosure of Material Information Comes 
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one commentator notes, “[t]he attainment of this goal is placed in the 
hands of the adversary process.  The parties attempt to prevent from 
sitting on the jury potential jurors who they suspect may harbor some 
bias or prejudice against their respective clients.”155  In addition to acting 
as a “filtering process” for prospective jurors, voir dire serves other 
important functions, such as being an information-gathering tool for a 
party to determine how to effectively use its peremptory challenges, as 
well as an opportunity to build rapport with jury members.156  In regards 
to the filtering role of voir dire, when a particular juror’s response or 
demeanor raises a suspicion of bias, he or she will not necessarily be 
immediately disqualified from jury service.157  Instead, for the sake of 
judicial economy, jurors are often subjected to a process called juror 
rehabilitation.158 
It is true that obtaining qualified jurors can pose a substantial 
obstacle to courts—as oftentimes jurors will fail to respond to requests 
for service or will be disqualified by some personal factor or a recent 
term of service.159  Yet when a conflict arises between costs and 
maintaining the impartiality and integrity of courts, the latter concern 
should prevail. 
 Trial judges typically conduct juror rehabilitation during voir dire 
 
to Light, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 315, 316 (2005) (“Voir dire examination . . . serves to protect a 
litigant’s right to an impartial trier of fact”). 
155. JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION 2 (3d ed. 
2011). 
156. See id. at 2–4.  Another possible function of voir dire is to educate jurors on legal 
principles and prepare them for the judge’s instructions.  See id. at 3–4.  However, this is not 
always agreed upon as a wise strategy.  TED M. WARSHAFSKY & FRANK T. CRIVELLO II, 
WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR WISCONSIN LAWYERS § 6:09 (3d ed. 
2005) (explaining that many lawyers are tempted to use voir dire to educate jurors based on 
the belief that jurors make up their minds early on in trial, but that this belief is misguided, as 
jurors tend to see through these efforts, which may negatively affect rapport with the jury).  
157. See infra notes 160–62 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of juror 
rehabilitation). 
158. WARSHAFSKY & CRIVELLO, supra note 156, § 6:15 (providing an overview of the 
development of juror rehabilitation as the result of bleak economic realities and how this 
development threatens the impartiality of the jury).  For an overview of how juror 
rehabilitation is becoming a greater issue in Wisconsin in light of recent social phenomena, 
including social campaigns to instill jurors with biases towards certain types of lawsuits as well 
as towards lawyers in general, see id. at 177.  
159. See, e.g., THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT MARSHAL’S OFFICE, ANNUAL 
REPORT 9–11 (2011).   
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and after a juror presents facts indicative of bias.160  The process involves 
a careful evaluation of the juror’s statements, demeanor, and tone in 
response to being asked about whether they can set aside the potential 
bias.161  A credible communication of impartiality is typically sufficient to 
allow the juror to serve on the jury.162  However, in Funk, the 
overturning of the trial court order for a new trial is akin to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rehabilitating juror Tanya G. based on the 
face value of her statements on the record and in spite of the trial 
judge’s analysis of her impartiality, given that the judge had the benefit 
of face-to-face impressions of her demeanor.163 
This approach is a cause for concern, as it appears to place 
Wisconsin among those states with liberal views of juror rehabilitation.164  
While adopting a view which essentially takes jurors’ statements at face 
value, Wisconsin has jeopardized the right to an impartial jury by 
ignoring the way that bias functions, as well as the crucial purpose of 
voir dire in acting as the avenue for discovering and eliminating those 
biases (or the appearance thereof) that are so strong that the legitimacy 
 
160. Juror rehabilitation is one way in which courts attempt to save on the cost and time 
of locating additional jurors, by exploring whether a juror is capable of setting aside potential 
biases and remaining an impartial evaluator of the evidence.  See Cosper, supra note 7, at 
1474–75; see also GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 154, at 53 (discussing whether knowledge is 
incompatible with impartiality and concluding that the more appropriate question is the 
extent to which the knowledge has impacted impartiality).   
 In the treason trial of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that a jury 
completely free of any preconceived notions regarding guilt or innocence is likely impossible, 
and thus the court is bound to consider whether the strength of these notions—those which 
“leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that testimony, constitute no sufficient 
objection to a juror.”  United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50–51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).  
161. See Cosper, supra note 7, at 1474–75 (explaining how the process of juror 
rehabilitation works generally).  
162. Id. at 1474 (explaining that juror rehabilitation is not a term likely to be found in 
law dictionaries, but it has become a “judicial tool of rising significance in courthouses across 
the country”).  The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that an affirmation of 
impartiality by a juror, if accepted by the trial judge, should be granted special deference and 
presumed correct.  See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1039–40 (1984) (demonstrating 
that the trial judge is in a superior position to evaluate whether a particular juror can be 
impartial and whether the juror’s statements of impartiality are sincere). 
163. See State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 63–64, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; infra 
Part VII.   
164. See Cosper, supra note 7, at 1489 (explaining that a liberal view of juror 
rehabilitation is one that allows extensive opportunity for a juror to be rehabilitated from 
more extreme showings of bias, extensive questioning by the judge to rehabilitate a juror, and 
little in terms of baseline measurements against which a juror’s response must be measured to 
qualify for rehabilitation).  
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of the jury’s verdict is easily called into question by members of the 
public.165  To effectively serve as a means of achieving impartiality in jury 
trials, an effective voir dire process must take account of the nature of 
both the jury trial and of human biases, and of those biases, seek to 
eliminate those that are most prone to poison the results of the trial.166  
Bias can arise from several different psychological phenomena, ranging 
from past experiences to societal or mental pressures, which guide a 
juror towards a given result based on a preconceived belief or feeling 
 
165. GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 154, at 49 (explaining that because of the secrecy 
of jury deliberations, and the absence of a requirement to provide a reason for their verdict, 
“[t]he guaranty of impartiality may be the most important safeguard of justice in an individual 
case”).  
 The goal of jury selection is impartiality, and this goal is made difficult when it is an 
appellate court is called on to review a determination of bias because:  
an appellate court is left with only a written transcript to review, several months, 
often several years, after the actual jury selection.  This reality limits our ability to 
fully assess the fairness and impartiality of an individual juror whom [it] [has] 
neither heard nor observed. The written transcript that [it] review[s] is usually 
limited only to the spoken word.  Yet a juror cannot speak fairness or talk 
impartiality. Fairness and impartiality are communicated.   
State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶ 140, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; see State v. Tody, 2009 
WI 31, ¶ 47, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737 (which demonstrated that Wisconsin juror bias 
case law, in addition to federal case law, has emphasized that the trial judge should err on the 
side of caution and eliminate jurors who exhibit “even the appearance of impropriety, bias, or 
prejudice” (quoting Elmore v. State, 44 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Ark. 2004))); see also Smith v. 
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (“Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide 
the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial 
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.”). 
 Speaking on another important part of voir dire, the United States Supreme Court 
stated: “[T]he peremptory satisfies the rule that ‘to perform its high function in the best way 
“justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”’”).  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 
(1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
166. See Cosper, supra note 7, at 1483 (“[A] threat exists that group deliberations may 
magnify small biases at an individual level.  Thus, while the correlation between individual 
bias and jury outcomes is unclear, the seating of one biased juror may have a drastic effect on 
the outcome of the litigation.”); James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 269–71 (1988) (explaining that both the secrecy of jury verdicts, and 
the extreme difficulty of appealing them, makes the impartial jury a greater necessity, as one 
impartial juror might be particularly influential during jury deliberations); Newton N. Minow 
& Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in the Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 
632 (1991); see also United States v. Vargas, 606 F.2d 341, 346 (1st Cir. 1979) (explaining that 
when a juror betrays the trust of the court by concealing information, the only means of 
redress is to determine whether there is enough bias or prejudice that maintaining the 
legitimacy of trials requires a new trial).  
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that stems from one of these phenomena.167  Because it is impossible for 
each bias to be properly accounted for, keen trial lawyers attempt to 
keep jurors who they believe will be sympathetic to their side.168 
However, the trial court judge is nonetheless obligated to eliminate 
those jurors whose biases, whether openly admitted or inferred from the 
circumstances, are so severe as to prevent them from considering and 
deciding upon the evidence presented at trial.169  Determining whether a 
particular juror’s bias necessitates a removal for cause, or in the case of 
a later-discovered bias, a new trial, is a complicated question that is best 
resolved by the trial court judge who can make use of his observations 
of juror’s nonverbal expressions and carefully weigh the circumstances 
of the case in light of an understanding of how bias operates.170  When 
 
167. Cosper, supra note 7, at 1481 (describing how bias can arise from the tendency of 
jurors to confirm pre-existing beliefs, which arise out of certain stereotypes and patterns of 
behavior that are unique to the individual and tune out evidence that goes against these 
beliefs).  Furthermore, biases, such as “belief perseverance” (where greater weight is given to 
information consistent with an earlier belief), are according more weight to information 
presented earlier on or the strong tendency to remain fixed on a belief despite contrary 
evidence as well as processing information guided by subconscious motivations.  Id. at 1482–
83; see Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 
71, 74 (2000) (explaining that group deliberation tends to polarize group members to stronger 
positions in alignment with their pre-existing beliefs).  
168. Gobert, supra note 166, at 271 (explaining that the “difficulty and challenge 
involved in identifying the components of impartiality is compounded by the fact that trial 
lawyers do not seek impartial jurors”); see WALTER F. ABBOTT & JOHN BATT, A 
HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH 1–10 (1999) (stating that the object of juror evaluation is to 
rid the jury pool of those jurors most favorable to the other side).  
169. See State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 716, 596 N.W.2d 770, 778 (1999) (illustrating 
that currently in Wisconsin, “subjective bias is most closely akin to what we had called actual 
bias, and . . . objective bias in some ways contemplates both our use of the terms implied and 
inferred bias”).  The court in Funk cites this same proposition.  State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, 
¶ 36 n.16, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
155 (1878) (explaining that the biases to be concerned with are those “deep impressions” 
which will cause a juror to ignore contrary evidence); GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 89, at 
62–63 (explaining that not all bias can be eliminated during voir dire and thus biases are 
evaluated as “a question of degree and not kind”).  
170. See Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 70, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting).  Chief Justice Abrahamson noted in her dissent:  
A juror’s good-faith belief that she is not or was not biased, however, is not 
necessarily an accurate belief.  Even if we could be assured of truthfulness, some 
people are incapable of making correct assessments of self, especially on an issue 
such as bias.  A juror may emphatically believe that she is not biased, yet 
unknowingly lack the ability to be impartial. 
Id. 
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relying solely on juror statements of impartiality—particularly taking 
the words alone from a court transcript at face value—the courts do not  
adequately recognize the importance of “[t]he right to a fair and 
impartial adjudication [which] extends not only to criminal defendants 
but also to the government and, through it, to society.”171  Justice 
Cardozo explained the potential hazard of allowing a juror who has 
concealed information on the jury in Clark v. United States:172 
The judge who examines on the voir dire is engaged in the 
process of organizing the court.  If the answers to the questions 
are willfully evasive or knowingly untrue, the talesman, when 
accepted, is a juror in name only.  His relation to the court and to 
the parties is tainted in its origin; it is a mere pretense and sham.  
What was sought to be attained was the choice of an impartial 
arbiter.  What happened was the intrusion of a partisan defender.  
If a kinsman of one of the litigants had gone into the jury room 
disguised as the complaisant juror, the effect would have been no 
different.  The doom of mere sterility was on the trial from the 
beginning.173 
Further, the fact that jurors’ statements of impartiality are often 
motivated by pressure from the judge, a sense of civic obligation, or 
pressure from other peers on the jury, regardless of the juror’s true 
feelings, means that liberally accepting them is a dereliction of the duty 
arising out of the right to an impartial jury that our judiciary and society 
should not tolerate.174  As studies have shown, past experiences of jurors, 
particularly those that can be closely assimilated to the trial or 
relationships to key witnesses, pose a significant threat to the likelihood 
of the jurors’ impartiality, and thus their statements must be taken as 
only a single factor in evaluating their impartiality.175 
 
171. Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1974), rev’d and 
remanded, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975); see FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 11 n.6 (explaining 
that a study demonstrated that rehabilitation during voir dire caused a reduction in the 
number of jurors (both biased and unbiased) who believed the defendant guilty, as well as a 
drop in confidence among those who held to the belief); GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 154, 
at 48.  See generally Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of 
Rehabilitative Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 212 
(2010) (elaborating on the subject of juror rehabilitation).  
172. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933). 
173. Id. at 11.  
174. Joshua S. Press, Untruthful Jurors in the Federal Courts: Have We Become 
Comfortably Numb?, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 253, 259 (2009).    
175. See GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 154, at 213 (providing that jurors who have 
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Therefore, while Wisconsin courts attempt to evaluate jurors for 
either objective or subjective biases, they should approach both tests 
with the totality of the circumstances in mind, as this best reflects the 
numerous sources of bias or concealment on the part of jurors.176  
Moreover, when a particular juror has been a victim of a crime, 
Wisconsin courts should carefully analyze the similarity and nature of 
the crimes, as well as any cues that can be gathered from the juror’s 
tone, demeanor, and statements regarding his or her impartiality.177  
Also, if applicable, the court should inquire into the reason for a juror’s 
failure to disclose that he or she had been a victim of a crime.178  Only 
upon consideration of all of these factors can the court truly be said to 
be fulfilling its duty to protect every litigant’s right to an impartial jury.179  
Focusing only upon the juror’s state of mind, as Wisconsin’s subjective 
bias standard does, fails to properly detect bias and places upon the trial 
lawyer a dangerous burden of sacrificing a conservative questioning 
strategy designed to build rapport with the jury, an issue that will be 
addressed in the next section.180 
 
been a victim of similar past crimes are more likely to identify with the victim); Scott E. 
Culhane et al., Crime Victims Serving as Jurors: Is There Bias Present?, 28 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 649, 655 (2004).  Important examples include the tendency of jurors who have been 
victims of a crime similar to that at issue in the trial (or know of a close friend or relative who 
was) to convict at higher rates than those who have not been a victim of crime, or have been a 
victim of a dissimilar crime (even if violent).  Id.  The study found that the closer that the 
crime at issue came to matching the juror’s previous victim experience, the higher the 
conviction rate amongst those jurors.  Id.  It should be noted, however, that although the 
difference in conviction rates was significant, it was not enough to lead the authors to 
conclude that a per se rule of exclusion should apply, but rather that jurors who have been 
past victims should be approached with particular caution.  Id. at 657.  
176. See Press, supra note 174, at 256–58 (explaining that reasons for jurors failing to 
answer a question appropriately during voir dire are numerous and both conscious and 
subconscious); supra text accompanying notes 25–26, 29. 
177. See, e.g., State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 22–23, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; 
State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, ¶ 10, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238.  
178. In Funk, the trial court’s analysis of whether Tanya G. was objectively biased 
included a comparison of the crimes which she had been victim to or witnessed, to those at 
issue in the case.  Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 22, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.   
179. See Case, supra note 154, at 326 (explaining that generally, courts should be 
permitted some discretion to make determinations in deciding to grant new trials when 
nondisclosure occurs). 
180. See Robert G. Loewy, Note, When Jurors Lie: Differing Standards for New Trials, 
22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 733, 761–62 (1995) (explaining that a strictly juror misconduct or actual 
bias standard is not an appropriate standard for deciding to grant a new trial).  As Loewy 
notes, the strict actual bias standard is inappropriate because: 
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VI. THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS CANNOT PROPERLY BE  
DETERMINED FROM VIEWING THE TRIAL RECORD:  
INSTITUTING THE TRANSAMERICA RULE 
Aside from cautioning against liberal juror rehabilitation, this 
Comment does not seek to advocate higher standards for juror 
placement, but rather to address the existing distribution of decision-
making authority in seating jurors and making determinations on juror 
bias.  The trial court, which oversees the voir dire and trial and is 
charged with the duty of ensuring an impartial trial, should be afforded 
greater deference to the decisions it makes to effectuate that goal.  One 
of the most troubling aspects of the Funk decision is that the decision to 
reinstate the verdict was based solely on an ex post facto review of the 
trial court record and the responses of Tanya G. during voir dire and in 
the post-conviction hearing.181  The trial judge was not consulted 
regarding the impressions upon which he based his assessment of Tanya 
G, nor was he consulted regarding any observations he may have made 
during the course of the trial and jury selection process, which ultimately 
led him to the conclusion that she was in fact biased.182 
While characteristics such as demeanor, tone of voice, and facial 
expressions are not traditionally considered “evidence,” their impact in 
 
First, as Justice Brennan noted in McDonough, jurors are particularly reluctant to 
admit their own biases.  This is because most people are either embarrassed about 
their biases or are unaware that they have biases, a problem that becomes even 
more acute after the trial is over, both because the state may have a stronger 
criminal contempt prosecution against the juror because the juror may be reluctant 
to give any information that would upset a verdict that, in large part, reflects a 
personal investment of time and energy. 
Id. at 762.  Likewise, Loewy explains why the actual bias standard is inappropriate “because it 
fails to account for the unique procedural posture of a post-trial hearing when a juror lies 
during voir dire.”  Id.  Additionally, Loewy argues that the important distinction is that jurors 
who reveal biases during voir dire may be rehabilitated, whereas if the juror’s bias is not 
revealed until later, no such option exists.  Id.; infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.  
181. See Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 63–64, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421; see supra text 
accompanying note 163.  
182. See Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 64, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.  Such an approach 
departs from previous case law that imparted both broad discretion to trial court judges, and 
disregarded the superior position that trial judges are in to gather information about a juror’s 
ability to be impartial based upon observable behaviors.  See, e.g., State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 
481, 497, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1998); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156–57 
(1878) (“[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real 
character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon 
the record.”).  
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the jury’s determination of whether or not a particular witness is 
credible cannot be denied.183  Due to the obvious dangers and 
complications that would be presented if the jury were allowed to make 
findings on another juror’s bias during jury selection, the judge is called 
upon to make crucial assessments as to the credibility of jurors whose 
honesty may be in question after they fail to answer or incorrectly 
answer a question posed during the jury selection process.184  Thus, the 
judge must consider the same factors that would affect a jury’s 
determination, such as those perceptions gathered from the prospective 
juror’s behavior during the trial and jury selection.185 
When an appellate court reviews a trial judge’s determination on 
juror bias, it does so without the information that can be gleaned from 
circumstances such as the juror’s demeanor.186  One possible solution is 
to institute a rule requiring appellate courts who are reviewing an issue 
of juror bias (e.g., a challenge for cause ruling or a lack of juror candor 
situation187) to consult with the trial judge regarding these impressions if 
the trial record does not contain clear indications of the judge’s 
reasoning behind either removing or refusing to remove a juror for 
cause.  Such a rule would function much like the rule in Wisconsin 
workers’ compensation cases from Transamerica Insurance Co. v. 
Department of Industry, Labor, & Human Relations,188 which prohibits 
 
183. DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 
5 (2d ed. 2008); see 4A WIS. PL. & PR. FORMS § 33:140 (5th ed. 2009): 
You should not reject the testimony of any witness from mere caprice or without 
reason, but give the testimony of each witness the weight which you think it is 
entitled to receive.  If you believe that any of the witnesses have not stated the truth, 
because of their appearance on the stand, the improbability of their statements, or 
for any other reason, you may reject that testimony.  However, you should not reject 
it without due care. 
4A WIS. PL. & PR. FORMS § 33:140. 
184. See State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770, 777 (1999) (noting that 
“[t]he requirement that a juror be indifferent is codified in [Wisconsin Statute] § 805.08(1) . . . 
[which] requires the [trial] court to examine on oath each person who is called as a juror to 
discover if he or she ‘has expressed or formed any opinion or is aware of any bias or prejudice 
in the case.’” (quoting WIS. STAT. § 805.08(1) (1995–1996))).  
185. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  
186. See infra text accompanying note 213.  
187. Faucher is an example of appellate review of a challenge for cause ruling.  See 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770.  for an example of appellate review of a new trial 
ruling based on a juror candor issue (where a juror failed to disclose information), see Funk, 
2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421, . 
188. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 54 Wis. 2d 
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the Labor and Industry Review Commission from overturning a hearing 
officer’s finding of credibility without having access to each hearing 
officer’s impressions of the witness.189 
While the Transamerica rule operates in a different context—
requiring evaluation of administrative law judge’s determinations of 
witness credibility—the trial court judge’s role in determining juror bias 
also relies heavily upon assessments of demeanor, tone, facial 
expressions, and essentially boils down to a credibility determination by 
the judge in evaluating the juror’s responses to questions regarding his 
or her ability to be impartial.190  Thus, instituting the Transamerica rule 
protects the parties’ due process rights by ensuring due deference to 
those best positioned to make assessments of witnesses’ credibility; the 
rule would require appellate courts to consult the impressions of trial 
court judges regarding potentially biased jurors and would serve the 
goal of impartiality and protect litigants’ due process rights.191 
 
272, 195 N.W.2d 656 (1972).   
189. Id. at 282–83, 195 N.W.2d at 662.   
190. Id.; see State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 730, 370 N.W.2d 745, 768 (1985) (“Bias may 
be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances.  The trial court must be satisfied that it 
is more probable than not that the juror was biased against the litigant.” (citing McCoy v. 
Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 659 (6th Cir. 1981))); see also Rose & Diamond, supra note 7, at 517 
(“Based on their interpretation of the juror’s answers and demeanor, judges may choose to 
regard the juror’s statement of fairness as credible (and, hence, choose not to excuse the juror 
for cause), or they may decide to ‘overrule’ the person’s own self-assessment and dismiss the 
juror for cause.”).  Compare Transamerica, 54 Wis. 2d at 285, 195 N.W.2d at 663–64 
(explaining that findings of fact in workmen’s compensation cases are not to be based merely 
on conjecture), with Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878) (explaining that the 
record is often insufficient for findings of fact), Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 115, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 
N.W.2d 421 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[w]hen deciding whether a juror is 
biased, a circuit court judge essentially must make a credibility determination”), and Funk, 
2011 WI 62, ¶ 67, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“a circuit court cannot blindly rely on a juror’s self-assessment”). 
191. The court in Transamerica stated: 
[W]here an examiner hears conflicting testimony and makes findings based upon the 
credibility of witnesses, and the commission thereafter reverses its examiner and 
makes contrary findings, the record should affirmatively show that the commission 
had the benefit of the examiner’s personal impressions of the material witnesses . . . .  
The demands of due process cannot be satisfied with anything less. 
Transamerica, 54 Wis. 2d at 282–83 n.14, 195 N.W.2d at 662 n.14 (quoting Braun v. Indus. 
Comm., 36 Wis. 2d 48, 57, 153 N.W.2d 81, 86 (1967)); see also State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 
497, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1998) (explaining that the trial court has the benefit of 
observing juror’s demeanor during voir dire, whereas the appellate court must make its 
assessment “from the cold, typewritten words of an appellate record”); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 
156–57. 
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Instituting the Transamerica rule in the juror bias context will 
promote the ultimate goal of voir dire, an impartial jury, which coincides 
with the constitutional right of the accused in a criminal trial.192  
Additionally, such a rule would foster both judicial economy and 
legitimacy by preventing embarrassing disagreements between trial and 
appellate courts, as well as possibly deterring costly appeals on decisions 
of a new trial.193  Likewise, the Transamerica rule would require greater 
cooperation between lower and appellate courts, allowing for a more 
integrated judicial system, as well as lessening the harsh effect of 
seemingly hyper-technical requirements to either preserve a right to 
challenge a refusal to remove a biased juror or grant a new trial when a 
juror has concealed information.194   
In Funk, the majority placed significant emphasis on three facts: (1) 
that there were no findings in the record upon which the trial court 
judge made his finding that Tanya G. was subjectively biased, (2) that 
Tanya G. was never asked specifically if she was a victim of sexual 
assault during voir dire, and (3) that Tanya G. was not asked her reason 
for why she did not disclose her past victimization.195  However, this 
emphasis is misplaced.196  As Justice Marshall stated in his dissent in 
Smith v. Phillips,197 “[t]he right to a trial by an impartial jury is too 
important, and the threat to that right too great, to justify rigid 
insistence on an actual proof of bias.  Such a requirement blinks 
reality.”198 
Trial counsel certainly must do their part to ensure that their client’s 
right to an impartial jury is protected (including making sure that the 
entire voir dire proceeding appears in the record and practicing effective 
questioning methods), yet where counsel has employed a reasonable 
strategy and a juror has nonetheless concealed information, the court 
 
192. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7; see Case, supra note 154, at 316 
(explaining that the purpose of voir dire is protecting each litigant’s right to an impartial 
jury); Cosper, supra note 7, at 1475; FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 2. 
193. See, e.g., Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 117, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (noting the 
inefficiency in having to have a new trial).   
194. See supra text accompanying notes 186–91.  
195. See Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶ 48, 60, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.  
196. As the majority states rather contradictorily “[s]ubjective bias also may be revealed 
through a juror’s demeanor, with a determination of bias resting on whether the circuit court 
finds the juror credible.”  Id. ¶ 46. 
197. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
198. Id. at 231–32 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Case, supra note 154, at 316. 
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should provide some leniency.199  Dictating an overly strict standard, 
such as that implicated by Funk, poses a potential threat to counsel’s 
trial strategies during voir dire, which may hinder another oft-cited 
important aspect of voir dire—building rapport with the jury.200 
While the effectiveness of both the voir dire and the jury system 
itself is often questioned by legal scholars,201 the longstanding tradition 
of both in our country, as well as the constitutional enshrinement of the 
jury trial, make it unlikely that either is departing any time soon.202  
Thus, attorneys must face the realities of voir dire head on. 
From what I have observed during several voir dire proceedings as a 
judicial intern and law clerk and from the input of attorneys I have 
spoken to, the voir dire process can be a challenge for jurors and 
attorneys alike.203  For jurors, the biggest challenge is accurately 
answering potentially embarrassing or personal questions.  For 
attorneys, the greatest challenges are maintaining focus of the jurors and 
keeping a keen ear to jurors’ responses.  To combat the tendency of 
jurors to lose focus, attorneys should begin with easy and open-ended 
questions to make the jurors feel at ease and to lay the foundation for 
the next line of questioning.204  Thus, a wise trial counsel may 
strategically decide not to immediately jump to pointed questions about 
 
199. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 747 (explaining that few states are willing to place 
heightened questioning standards on lawyers, because they can cause drawn out voir dire 
proceedings and strain attorney—juror rapport). 
200. See, e.g., FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 3 (explaining that the second goal of voir 
dire is building a favorable rapport with the jurors, which is done by showing respect and 
interest in the jurors and making them feel at ease to promote an open forum).  
201. Compare Marc Mezibov, The Mapplethorpe Obscenity Trial, LITIGATION, Summer 
1992, at 12 (explaining the extensive efforts in jury selection undertaken by counsel), with 
William C. Smith, Challenges of Jury Selection, 88 A.B.A. J. 34 (2002), and comparative law 
articles regarding the jury system (explaining that jury selection is often misused by counsel as 
an opportunity to explain the law, rather than to build rapport and eliminate biases), e.g., 
Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 443, 469–99 (1997) (explaining the advantages 
and disadvantages of a jury system). 
202. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (addressing a right to a jury trial in a criminal context); 
WIS. CONST. art. I §§ 5, 7 (guaranteeing a right to jury trial in both criminal and civil 
contexts).  See generally JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 1 (2006) (providing an overview of the 
development of the American jury system). 
203. See generally Alan M. Tuerkheimer, Persuading Jurors During Voir Dire, WIS. 
LAW., Nov. 2006, at 14. 
204. Id. at 16.   
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unpleasant experiences, such as whether a person “or someone they 
knew, had ever been a victim of sexual assault.”205  Instead, counsel may 
attempt to build rapport with jury members by asking broader questions 
to determine if these more offensive or private questions have to be 
asked and also to limit the targets of these questions to preserve as 
much rapport and juror privacy as possible.206  While arguably counsel 
has alternative methods to ensure juror privacy, such as the use of jury 
questionnaires, the effectiveness of these procedures at actually 
maintaining privacy has been questioned and may impose additional 
costs on attorneys and their clients.207 
Regardless of whether these methods are available, Wisconsin courts 
should be hesitant to restrict attorneys from forming effective 
questioning strategies.  Judges should also be less sympathetic to jurors 
who fail to disclose information, as the same non-disclosure may occur 
regardless of the method of questioning.  However, this approach 
towards allowing counsel to mold their own voir dire strategy appears to 
be greatly hindered by the court in Funk.  This is because the Funk 
decision repeatedly placed blame on counsel for his questions being 
 
205. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 4, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (explaining that 
counsel did not ask whether anyone had been a victim of sexual assault).   
206. See FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 6 (explaining that Wisconsin follows a 
combined method of jury selection, in which “[p]otential jurors are questioned in a group 
where both individual and group questioning occurs”); GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 89, 
at 108 (finding that while there is no constitutional right of juror privacy, “the privacy of 
prospective jurors [is] an appropriate factor to be considered in passing on a given voir dire 
question”).  In addition, jurors are capable of detecting when attorneys have ulterior motives.  
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 203, at 16.  
207. Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires; (Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
1, 16–29 (2007) (explaining that despite possible benefits of a more open ended questioning of 
jurors, jury questionnaires may cause more damage through unnecessarily broad questioning, 
reduced ability to interact and observe jurors, and the potential to place private identification 
information into public record).  It is not my intention to address the use of juror 
questionnaires extensively in this Comment, and I will only briefly acknowledge that 
currently their use is rising in popularity, although whether they are truly beneficial is still 
open for debate.  See id.  While the use of jury questionnaires has become an increasingly hot 
topic among scholars, some sources have indicated that despite all of the hype, questionnaires 
are actually riddled with more costs then benefits.  Id. at 17.  Further, Colquitt argues that the 
cost of jury questionnaires, which is significant, goes beyond merely dollars and cents.  Id. at 
17–18 (stating that “[i]t is not enough to weigh the utility of a questionnaire solely with regard 
to its cost in dollars and time, although that cost alone is significant”).  Nonetheless, others 
insist that questionnaires are excellent time savers and more accurate at finding bias as people 
are more willing to be truthful when forced to write down answers.  See, e.g., FREDERICK, 
supra note 155, at 167–68 (describing the apparent benefits of juror questionnaires).  
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“inartfully posed” despite the probability that had Tanya G. 
appropriately answered the question, further questions would have 
revealed her past during voir dire.208  Placing such a burden to explore 
every avenue on trial counsel when counsel has good reason to believe 
that doing so is both a waste of time and potentially bad for their 
rapport with the jury, runs against one highly-prevalent general criticism 
of voir dire, that it is unnecessarily long and intrusive.209 
Instead, appellate judges should provide the same type of special 
deference on findings of juror credibility that is currently afforded to 
hearing officers in workers’ compensation cases using the Transamerica 
rule.210  Instead of simply noting the absence of clear impressions on the 
record, like Justice Roggensack’s opinion did in Funk, appellate judges 
reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a new trial based on juror 
concealment should consult with the trial judge to gather his or her 
impressions of the juror in question.211  After consulting with the trial 
judge, an appellate judge would still possess the power to overturn the 
trial court’s decision if the trial judge’s impressions were found to be 
baseless or clearly contrary to the record.  However, requiring appellate 
judges to consult trial judges on these matters would ensure that the 
right to an impartial jury is carefully considered and the superior 
position of the trial judge to gather invaluable non-verbal cues from 
jurors is respected.212 
 
208. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 63, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (agreeing with the court 
of appeals that Tanya G.’s non–answers were not sufficient for a finding of objective bias); see 
supra note 180 and accompanying text (illustrating that there are numerous reasons for non-
disclosure).  
209. Loewy, supra note 180, at 747 (explaining that while many states impose a 
materiality standard, few states are willing to impose a heightened specificity standard, 
because such a requirement can produce extra lengthy voir dire proceedings).  Asking specific 
questions after there is a reason to believe that these questions are unnecessary “could also 
put unnecessary strain on the lawyer/juror relationship.”  Id.  
210. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of ILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 282, 195 N.W.2d 656, 
662 (1972).  
211. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 48, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (illustrating the absence of 
the trial judge’s findings on the record).  Justice Roggensack’s opinion states:  
A finding of subjective bias must be based on factual findings that show the specific 
juror’s state of mind.  No such findings were made here . . . .  The court also did not 
make any findings about her demeanor that indicated subjective bias . . . .  
Accordingly, the circuit court’s finding that Tanya G. was subjectively biased against 
Funk is not supported by facts of record and is clearly erroneous. 
Id.; see also Transamerica, 54 Wis. 2d at 282–83, 195 N.W.2d at 662.  
212. See Transamerica, 54 Wis. 2d at 282–83, 195 N.W.2d at 662; see also Funk, 2011 WI 
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The Transamerica rule is grounded in common sense and scientific 
understandings of human nature in the juror bias context.213  Non-verbal 
gestures and expressions are an integral part of human communication, 
and, thus, for our legal system to successfully accomplish its purpose as 
an impartial means of resolving disputes and allegations, a keen 
awareness of this aspect of human nature is mandatory.214  Because the 
trial court judge is the only judicial authority who has the opportunity to 
visually and aurally observe the juror’s tone and demeanor, he or she is 
in the best position to determine whether a juror is sincere in his or her 
assertions of impartiality as a “function of the circuit court’s experiences 
and knowledge of human nature.”215  While the results of scientific 
studies concerning people’s ability to detect deception in others indicate 
that generally people can only achieve a “chance” or fifty percent rate of 
accuracy in detecting deception, other studies indicate that certain 
people whose professions require a special interest in determinations of 
truthfulness are consistently more accurate.216 
 
62, ¶ 48 n.14, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421.  The decision in Funk appears to abandon any 
notion of deference to the trial court, as well as recognize that there is more to be gathered 
from juror’s expressions than the words that comprise them.  Id. ¶ 48 (describing that the trial 
court made no findings of fact regarding Tanya G.’s bias and thus neglecting the simple 
powers of observation, which only the trial court is capable of exercising).  Both federal and 
Wisconsin state courts have shown strong support of trial court discretion in prior case law.  
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
213.  Non-verbal behaviors are inextricably linked to communication.  See Paul Ekman 
& Wallace V. Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception, 32 PSYCHIATRY J. FOR 
THE STUDY INTERNAL PROCESSES 88, 88 (1969) [hereinafter Ekman, Nonverbal Leakage] 
(exploring the relationship between verbal and non-verbal communication and highlighting 
that non-verbal communications are not simply redundant of simultaneous verbal 
communications and that different body parts will convey different messages).  See generally 
Paul Ekman et al., Facial Expressions of Emotion: An Old Controversy and New Findings, 
335 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 63, 64 (1992) (explaining the physiological 
changes that the body undergoes when a certain facial expression is used, regardless of 
whether the person truly intends to convey that emotion). 
214. This Comment is not intended to extensively address theories of non-verbal 
communications, but some understanding of the concepts is necessary to demonstrate the 
importance of these communications as a source of information to trial judges in achieving 
the most impartial jury possible.  See generally Ekman, Nonverbal Leakage, supra note 213.  
215. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 71, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the basis on which trial court judges are to make determinations of 
subjective bias).  Studies have indicated that sixty to sixty-five percent of all communication 
takes place through nonverbal behaviors.  FREDERICK, supra note 155, at 43.   
216. See Robin S. Edelstein et al., Detecting Lies in Children and Adults, 30 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 8 (2006) (demonstrating that “average observer[s] [were] at chance when 
discriminating between true and false statements,” but that others portrayed higher levels of 
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Trial court judges handle countless jury trials in a given year and sit 
upon a greater wealth of information (including non-verbal 
communications of jurors) on which to assess a juror’s sincerity, unlike 
appellate judges performing cold reviews of the court record.217  Should 
this interest and experience prove insufficient in improving judges’ 
accuracy, the possibility of specialized training similar to that 
undertaken by law enforcement personnel remains open.  Even absent 
such training, the judgment of the trial court judge should be respected 
as it is grounded on some human intuition more closely connected to 
that individual trial experience than the appellate court can claim.218 
Another suggested approach to this problem is to simply presume in 
cases where jurors have not disclosed information during voir dire that 
the juror is biased, requiring the judge to grant a new trial to maintain 
the “appearance of justice.”219  While it is difficult to dispute the 
efficiency by which this method would preserve the appearance of 
 
accuracy and additional study of these individuals may provide important information about 
“specific behavioral or verbal cues,” which may be useful in training judges).  Furthermore, 
the presence of non-verbal leakage clues is a thoroughly studied phenomena, and while there 
has been disagreement as to the accuracy of various clues, there is little doubt that much of 
what a person intends, or does not intend, to communicate is exhibited by non-verbal 
behavior.  See generally Ekman, Nonverbal Leakage, supra note 213. 
217. Paul Ekman, Maureen O’Sullivan & Mark G. Frank, A Few Can Catch a Liar, 10 
PSYCHOL. SCI., 263, 264–65 (1999) [hereinafter Ekman, Few Can Catch a Liar] 
(demonstrating that federal judges achieved an average of over 60% accuracy at detecting lies 
or truthfulness in a study conducted by Paul Ekman, Maureen O’Sullivan, and Mark G. 
Frank). 
218. See id. at 265 (providing the results of the study of Paul Ekman and others, 
indicating that “it is possible for some people to make highly accurate judgments about lying 
and truthfulness without any special aids such as slowed motion, repeated viewing, and the 
scoring of subtle changes by either trained coders or computer-based measurements”; 
illustrating that groups with special interest or expertise in detecting deception performed 
better than those who did not possess a special interest or expertise; describing that the task 
which judges would be most likely to have to concern themselves with in examining jurors—
whether there are any signs of lying—was found to be the most accurately performed by 
judges); see also Rose & Diamond, supra note 7, at 533 (demonstrating that the more 
confidently a juror attests to his or her impartiality, the less likely that he or she is to be 
excused); id. (“Further, confidence predicted some of the judges’ own impressions of the 
jurors’ abilities to be fair”); id. at 535 (explaining that “judges may simply see value in using 
confident self-reports as a cue for an ability and willingness to be fair, whereas attorneys do 
not.”). 
219. Case, supra note 154, at 337 (explaining that because perceptions of bias degrade 
the integrity of the court in the eyes of the public, courts should eliminate even the 
appearance of bias); see also supra text accompanying notes 111, 113 (demonstrating that the 
notion of guarding against the appearance of bias is not unfamiliar to Wisconsin case law).  
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justice, this approach creates the threat that counsel who become aware 
of a juror’s non-disclosure during voir dire may fail to notify the court, 
so that the counsel may preserve the right to a new trial if a favorable 
result is not reached.220  While most appellate courts will not allow this to 
occur, the possibility that a lawyer may attempt to conceal his 
knowledge of the juror’s failed disclosure, as well as the needless delay 
that will result if a new trial must be awarded, weigh against the use of 
the “Missouri Rule,” which grants new trials whenever it is found that a 
juror concealed information.221  Therefore, instituting a Transamerica 
type rule in juror bias situations is a better practice that is more fully 
supported by the underlying policy considerations of voir dire,222 as well 
as by logical and scientific understandings of human interactions than 
the current approach.223 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE COURT’S DECISION IN STATE V. FUNK 
THREATENS THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND DISREGARDS A 
LONG LINE OF PRECEDENT SUPPORTING TRIAL COURT DISCRETION 
IN DETERMINING JUROR BIAS 
From the case law for juror bias in Wisconsin, as well as at the 
federal level, it is clear that a strong policy towards granting trial court 
discretion on determinations of juror bias was present but not 
sufficiently respected by the court’s decision in Funk.224  Furthermore, 
the seemingly hyper-technical requirements that the decision places on 
counsel to ask every possible question disrupts trial strategy and could 
potentially impose additional costs to litigation.225  The majority decision 
in Funk places the right to an impartial jury trial in peril, with the only 
foreseeable benefit being the potential to save on the cost of new 
 
220. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 747.  
221. Case, supra note 154, at 338; Loewy, supra note 180, at 749; see also Vivion v. 
Brittain, 510 P.2d 21, 24–25 (Wyo. 1973) (denying a motion for new trial based on theory that 
juror failed to disclose involvement in prior litigation where counsel had actual knowledge of 
this fact having taken part in that very litigation). 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 166–80. 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 213–14. 
224. See, e.g., supra note 45; State v. Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, 270, 518 N.W.2d 232, 239 
(1994); Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that a juror’s 
statements of impartiality are not conclusive proof of impartiality and that determinations of 
juror credibility are uniquely suited to a trial judge’s discretion); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985) (explaining that determinations or juror credibility are traditionally a 
matter for the trial judge to decide); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).  
225. See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text.  
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trials.226  However, saving on this expense comes at the cost of 
potentially stripping criminal defendants of their constitutional rights, as 
well as the integrity of Wisconsin’s judicial system.227 
Moreover, simply presuming, like in the Missouri approach, that 
jurors who do not disclose material information are biased would also 
erode the integrity of Wisconsin courts.228  While this approach certainly 
preserves the appearance of justice229 by eliminating jurors who create 
suspicion for bias, it does not adequately consider the serious costs of 
new trials to all parties involved.  Instead, to best protect litigant’s rights 
of due process, Wisconsin courts should provide special deference to the 
trial court because the trial court maintains a superior position to 
interpret the credibility of a juror either during voir dire or, in the case 
of juror candor cases, in post-trial hearings.230  Providing this discretion 
to the trial court will guard against results that mar the appearance of 
justice, such as the court’s decision in Funk, as well as promote judicial 
integrity by reducing the amount of overturned lower court decisions.231  
By requiring appellate courts to consult with trial court judges regarding 
their impressions of jurors before upsetting the trial court’s ruling, 
 
226. State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶ 82, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the majority's approach seemed to take a step back from the existing 
case law).  In particular, Justice Bradley stated: 
Here, the circuit court assessed the voir dire as a whole.  It compared the factual 
similarities between Tanya G.’s assaults and the facts of this case, evaluated her 
nonresponsiveness, weighed her subsequent conflicting statements, and concluded, 
“I must follow the law.”  Ultimately it determined that a reasonable person in Tanya 
G’s position could not be impartial.  Rather than giving deference to those on the 
front lines making these tough decisions, the majority turns back the clock.  It 
applies a long-discarded test which skews its analysis and leaves confusion in its 
wake.  
Id.  
227. See Case, supra note 154, at 337 (“Without attention to the perception of the 
fairness of the legal system, we risk disintegration and, ultimately, defiance.”  (quoting Patrick 
E. Longan, Civil Trial Reform and the Appearance of Fairness, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 299 
(1995))).  
228. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 749–51. 
229. See Case, supra note 154, at 337; McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (describing the cost of trials to the parties, the jurors, and the 
society). 
230. See supra notes 190, 206.  
231. Compare the majority opinion in Funk, 2011 WI 62, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 
421, with the dissent by Justice Abrahamson, id. ¶¶ 65–79 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting), and 
with Justice Bradley’s dissent, id. ¶¶ 80–120 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
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Wisconsin courts would demonstrate respect for the complexities of bias 
that align with understandings of human nature and judicial integrity.232  
Most importantly, the Transamerica rule would clearly demonstrate to 
the public the court’s efforts at ensuring justice and would prevent ugly 
perceptions that are created when appellate courts make judgment calls 
based off of “the cold, typewritten words of an appellate record.”233 
KURT F. ELLISON* 
 
 
232. See supra Part VI. 
233. State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 497, 579 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (1998); see also State 
v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 721, 596 N.W.2d 770, 780 (1999) (providing that the trial judge’s 
determination as to juror’s objective bias is only overturned if as a matter of law a reasonable 
judge could not have reached such a conclusion). 
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